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ABSTRACT
If contracts are costlessly enforcible then insolvency is the only reason
for nonrepayment of loans. While some models have examined the borrower's
incentive to repay, it has typically been assumed that the penalty suffered by
a debtor in default is imposed automatically and without cost to the lender.
If in fact invoking a penalty is costly, Pareto—improving loans may be
dynamically inconsistent not because of the absence of a sufficiently harsh
penalty for default, but because the lender has no incentive actually to
implement the penalty in the event of default. In such situations infinitely—
lived institutions can emerge as banking intermediaries between lenders and
borrowers. These institutions, repeatedly involved in lending, have an
incentive to enforce contracts that individual lenders lack. They can
consequently sustain more lending. For their reputations as enforcers of
contracts to have value requires that banks earn strictly positive profits.
Maintaining the value of bank equity also provides an incentive for bank
owners to invest deposits rather than to use these funds fraudulently.
Because of the supernormal profits that banks must earn, an equilibrium that
is sustained by bank reputation will not replicate an equilibrium in which







Most analysis of financial markets posits that contracts are costlessly
enforcible. The borrower's insolvency is consequently the only reason for
nonrepayment of debt.In a domestic context a creditor typically has access
to a legal system to gain control of the assets of a borrower in default. The
borrower thus has no incentive to default if he does in fact have resources to
make payment. The value of the borrower's assets limits the lender's loss if
default should occur.
In some contexts, particularly in international financial markets, a
creditor's ability to use the courts to gain ownership of the assets of a
borrower in default is much more limited. Where major net movements of
capital across borders are involved, most of the borrower's assets lie outside
the jurisdiction of the creditor's government. The incentive of the
borrower's government to enforce repayment or transfer assets is much more
limited, especially if the borrower in default is the government itself. In
fact, lenders' inability to obtain control of the assets of borrowers in
default has led to a great deal of concern over the value of sovereign loans
to several developing countries. These countries have assets whose value is
clearly far in excess of their outstanding debts, but their willingness to pay
these debts is in some doubt. In the absence of a military intervention that
is unlikely, lenders have no means of gaining control of these assets should
repayment not occur.
Nevertheless, lenders have extended loans under these circumstances and
borrowers have serviced debt. Clearly both types of agents perceive that
borrowers will suffer adverse consequences from nonpayment. In fact, foreign
borrowers in default may lose further access to credit markets. Their ability2
tosmooth consumption and to finance investment and trade is consequently
hampered.
1
This type of penalty, unlike a transfer of assets to creditors, does not
benefit the creditors. In fact, imposing such a penalty may be costly to them
as well as to borrowers. The existence of such penalties replaces one
paradox, why debtors repay, with another, why creditors impose penalties on
borrowers in default.
This paper develops a model of financial markets in which creditors'
control over their debtors' assets is limited. In the presence of costly
enforcement of contracts or of potential fraud, any direct transfers between
lenders and borrowers would not be viable, even though they would increase the
welfare of both types of agents. Financial institutions, repeatedly involved
in lending, have an incentive to enforce contracts that individual lenders
lack. They can consequently sustain some lending. For their reputations as
enforcers of contracts to have value requires that they earn a profit strictly
above zero. An equilibrium in which bank reputation supports loan contracts
will not, as a consequence, replicate an equilibrium in which loan repayment
is automatically guaranteed.
The analysis here uses a variant of Samuelson's (1958) pure consumption
loan model. Each agent is economically active for two periods. One type,
called lenders, earns income only in the first period; another, called
borrowers, only in the second. Both derive positive utility from consumption
in both periods. A temptation naturally arises for lenders to lend to
borrowers. 2
The first part of the analysis treats the incomes of both types of agents
as exogenous. Borrowers experience a penalty if they do not repay, but
imposing the penalty is costly for lenders.3
At first, it is assumed that the penalty is imposed automatically in the
event of default. Direct lending from lenders to borrowers is then viable.
If the penalty is sufficiently high lending in the amount that would occur if
repayment were guaranteed is possible. This equilibrium is consequently
attained. Otherwise, the impact of the penalty will constrain what borrowers
owe in the repayment period.3 Lenders always benefit from an increase in the
penalty. The effect on borrowers depends upon the elasticity of loan
supply. If loans are supplied elastically they benefit from a high penalty;
if loan supplies are interest inelastic they lose.
It is then assumed that the lender chooses whether or not to invoke the
penalty in the event of default when default occurs. If it is costly to
implement the penalty an individual lender would not do so. The threat to
impose the penalty is therefore not credible, so the borrower has no reason to
repay. The lender, aware that he will not recover any loan, lends nothing in
the first place.
A financial institution called a hank is introduced that intermediates
between lenders and borrowers. It issues equity to lenders, accepts deposits
from them, and lends to borrowers. If loans are repaid then deposits are
withdrawn and equity holders in the bank can sell their equity at a positive
value to lenders of the next generation, since the institution has maintained
its reputation for collecting loans. If loans are not repaid and no penalty
is imposed then the institution loses its reputation and the value of its
equity is zero. If the penalty is imposed, however, equity value is
maintained. Maintaining the value of bank equity thus provides an incentive
for the owners of banks to penalize borrowers in default. The threat to
impose the penalty is made credible.
For bank equity to have value requires that banks earn excess profits.4
The interest rate on loans consequently exceeds that on deposits. Even if
credit is not rationed the equilibrium that would emerge if repayment were
guaranteed automatically is not replicated.4
Finally, production is introduced. Lenders are workers who receive a
wage in the first period of their lives. Borrowers are firms that borrow to
invest in capital and hire workers to produce output. Banks intermediate
between workers and firms. Workers can become investors in bank deposits or
owners of banks. Maintaining the value of bank equity provides the incentive
for bankers to invest deposits in firms rather than to consume them. Again,
for bank equity to have strictly positive value requires that the marginal
product of capital, what banks earn on loans, exceeds the deposit rate. Since
investment in bank equity absorbs some workers' saving, the capital—labor
ratio, output and wage are lower in an equilibrium in which repayment is
sustained by bank reputation in comparison with an unconstrained equilibrium.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the basic
assumptions of the model and characterizes equilibrium when penalizing
nonpayment is automatic. A penalty that must be invoked by lenders at a cost,
so that lending requires the intermediation of banks, is considered in section
3. Section 4 treats lending by workers to firms when there is a potential for
fraud. Some concluding remarks appear in section 5.
2. An Equilibrium with Direct Lending
Two types of individuals, lenders and borrowers, have endowments over two
periods given by (wi, 0) and (0, wb), respectively. They attain levels of
utility v and b that are increasing, differentiable and quasi—concave
functions of their consumption levels in the two periods, (c'', c?),5
where i =£for lenders and i =bfor borrowers. The number of lenders is
normalized at one; there are n borrowers.
2.1 The Unconstrained Equilibrium
If lenders and borrowers can enter into loan contracts that are
automatically enforcible then a competitive equilibrium will establish a loan







£*andr* will be referred to as the unconstrained loan amount and interest
rate.
If P denotes the penalty of nonrepayment in terms of second period
consumption then the unconstrained equilibrium is enforcible as long as
P > (1+r*)t*/n (3)
2.2 The Rationed Equilibrium
If condition (3) is not satisfied, then lenders will ration credit.







Total lending is constrained by a repayment ceiling nP. Competition among
lenders for solvent borrowers will drive the interest rate to the point at
which lenders are satisfied to lend nP/(i+r) at an interest rate i+r. This
equilibrium is referred to as the rationed equilibrium.
To compare the interest rate, the amount lent, and welfare in the
unconstrained and rationed regimes, consider an equilibrium in which
nP =(1+r*)1*,so that the unconstrained equilibrium is just enforcible, and
examine the effect of a reduction in P. Three results follow:
Proposition 1: The interest rate is lower in the rationed equilibrium than in
the unconstrained equilibrium and the interest rate decreases when the penalty
of default decreases.
Proof: Since expression (5), the lender's first—order condition for optimal
lending, is satisfied in both equilibria, = ,where
is the change in loan supply resultinq from an increase in the interest r
rate. Differentiating condition (4) with respect to P, using this
relationship, gives
[(1+r) +£3f= n (6)
As long as lenders' consumption in the retirement period is non—inferior,7
(1+r).increases when r increases. Consequently (1+r) .-+ £is positive.
Hence is also.
The interest rate consitutes lenders' terms of trade. From Proposition 1
immediately follows
Proposition 2: Lenders' welfare is lower in the rationed equilibrium than in
the unconstrained equilibrium. Their welfare rises as the penalty of default
rises.
Finally
Proposition 3: Borrowers' welfare can be higher or lower in the rationed
equilibrium, and they can benefit or lose from an increase in the penalty P.
For the unconstrained equilibrium to be preferred, and for an increase in the
penalty to raise their welfare, requires that loan supply be positively
interest elastic.
Proof: In a rationed equilibrium a borrower's lifetime utility is




whichis negative unless is strictly positive.
Jaffee and Russell (1976), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) and Sachs (1984)
have partial equilibrium models in which the borrower always benefits from an
increase in the penalty for default. They treat the lenders' interest rate as
a constant, so that the term is implicitly infinity. If loan supply
to borrowers as a group is more inelastic an increase in the default penalty8
can act to borrowers' detriment.
3. A Banking Equilibrium
The previous section assumed that the default penalty is invoked
automatically or that the lender finds it in his interest to impose the
penalty, presumably because the amount of the debt recovered exceeds the cost
of implementing it. A borrower in default in many circumstances can prevent a
lender from recovering much of his loan. For example, he may consume as it
is received, before the lender can seize it. In these cases the individual
lender has no incentive to impose the penalty if doing so is costly. Aware of
this, the borrower has no incentive to repay. In turn, the lender's knowledge
of the borrower's awareness removes any incentive to lend in the first
place. Equilibrium degenerates to autarky.
If the lender expected to lend again, and there were no finite upper
bound on the number of times he expected to lend again, the desire to maintain
a reputation for punishing default could serve as an incentive to punish
current nonrepayment. In this model, individual lenders anticipate lending
only once, however. There is no incentive to maintain a reputation to punish
default.
In this context a situation emerges in which finitely—lived individuals
can establish infinitely—lived corporate entities to act as banking
intermediaries. If these banks earn positive profits their equity will have
value. Owners of equity in banks then have an incentive to enforce repayment
to maintain the value of their equity.
Let denote the value of bank equity at time t. At the end of period t
lenders invest their savings in bank deposits (in amount dt) which promise a9
return r ,andin bank equity (worth Bankslend deposits to borrowers
at a rate rt. At the end of period t+1, if repayment occurs, banks receive
(1+rt)dt from borrowers, pay depositors (1+r)dt, and distribute (r_r')d to
bank shareholders as a dividend. Shareholders sell their equity to young
lenders for q,1. If borrowers default then banks in turn default on deposits
and there is no dividend. If default is left unpunished the bank loses its
reputation to enforce repayment. The value of bank equity becomes zero. If
the bank imposes the penalty, even though current loans are not repaid, the
bank's reputation is maintained. Even though deposits are defaulted upon and
there is no dividend, the value of bank equity remains positive, since a
promise to pay future dividends is credible. Faced with a borrower in
default, owners of a bank must decide whether to incur the cost of punishment,
thereby maintaining the value of their equity, or to avoid the punishment cost
hut lose the value of their equity investment in the bank.If denotes the
value of a bank that at the end of period t has maintained a reputation to
punish default and P' denotes the cost of imposing the penalty on a borrower,
then the choice will depend upon whether
cit
nP'.
The value of a bank with a reputation to enforce repayment is the




Thedeposit rate r is the relevant discount rate since lenders invest either
in bank equity or in deposits.
Lenders' saving each period takes the form of deposits and bank equity,
so that10
£yQ. w -c(w,r) =dt
+ (9)
Either >nP'Vtor else for anywhen q < nP', =0for t < .
Asteady state is characterized by constant values of the interest rates
on deposits and loans, F' and ,respectively,a deposit amount, a,anda
value of hank equity, ,thatsatisfy
=(F—F')a (10)
w-c(w,i') = + (11)
> nP' (12)
v =(1÷F)vif (1+)d < nP
(13)
vb > (1-4-F)v if (1+)a =
Competitionamong banks in setting r' to attract depositors and r to
attract borrowers will insure that condition (12) holds with equality, since,
given r, r' falls as q rises.
The two interest rates are consequently related by the expression
— a+nP'-' r= r (14)
the difference between them rises as the cost of imposing the punishment rises
relative to total deposits.ii
3.1An Unconstrained Banking Equilibrium
When condition (13) is an equality then the default penalty does not
constrain the amount borrowed. A small change in P will then, of course, have
no effect. The effect in steady state of a change in P' on the welfare of
borrowers and lenders can be determined solely by its effects on r and r'.
A change in P', from condition (12), requires a proportional change in
the value of bank equity. Given F', and hence ÷a,a mustfall
-
bynAP', so rises by nAP'. If borrowers' loan demand has a unit interest
a
elasticity(—.L -= 1)then in fact F'anda÷donot change. Lenders
b
are consequently indifferent to the increase in P' while borrowers are
harmed. If the borrowers loan demand elasticity exceeds one then there is an
excess supply of loans at the initial F'; F' consequently falls. In this
case lenders suffer when P' rises. Conversely, if the borrowers' loan demand
elasticity is less than one then an excess demand for loans emerges;F' must
rise.In this case lenders benefit from the increase in P'. As long as the
loan market is stable, an increase in P' causes r to rise, so that borrowers
necessarily lose.
3.2 A Constrained Equilibrium
Consider next the case in which, if condition (13) were to hold with
equality, then borrowers' debt—service obligations would exceed the burden of
the penalty. The amount that lenders would receive in retirement would be
determined by the size of the penalty P plus the value of bank equity, nP.
The relationship12
(1+F')[w—c(w,i')] =n(P+P') (15)
consequently determines the lenders' interest rate. As long as c is non—
inferior the left—hand side of expression (15) rises with F'.Consequently
F', and thus lenders' welfare, increases when either the default penalty, P,
or the cost of imposing the penalty, P', rises, i.e.,
dF'—di''— n - —
dc/dr'
> 16










Borrowerslose from a more severe penalty unless lenders have highly interest—
elastic savings, as is the case with direct lending. The effect of an
increase in the cost of imposing the penalty on borrowers' utility is
b dc'dc°
=_vb(l+! / .._&) (18)
dF' dF'
which is always negative.
In summary, an increase in the cost of imposing the penalty is always
detrimental to borrowers. If the default penalty constrains lending then an13
increase in this cost actually benefits lenders. Whether or not they benefit
in the unconstrained case depends upon how inelastic borrowers' loan demand
is.As with direct lending, an increase in the penalty itself is always to
the lenders' advantage and, unless the supply of lenders' savings is highly
interest elastic, to the disadvantage of borrowers.
4. A Banking Equilibrium with Production and Potential Fraud
Consider now a situation in which the income of lenders and borrowers is
determined by a production process that employs labor and capital to generate
output. Production is at constant returns to scale so that output per worker
is a function f(k) of capital per worker k.
Lenders are workers who earn a wage w in the first period of their
lives. Borrowers are firms that invest capital, employ labor and produce
output. Firms are competitive.
Workers cannot invest directly in firms. The intermediation of banks is
required. Workers can become investors in hank deposits, which promise a
return r', or owners of banks. Bankers accept deposits. They can consume
these deposits as they receive them, in which case the value of their bank
equity the following period is zero. Alternatively they can invest deposits
in firms, earning the marginal product of capital, pay depositors a return r',
and maintain a positive value of bank equity. By assumption the only source
of moral hazard is the consumption of deposits by owners of banks. If bank
owners invest them then repayment on deposits is guaranteed.5
For simplicity, assume that workers regard consumption in the first and
second periods as perfect substitutes, and that the discount rate is zero.
Their utility function can then he written v(c+c°).14
Equilibrium in the market for bank equity requires that the return on
equity equal the return on deposits, r'.If r' > 0 then all wage income is
saved while if r' < 0 all is consumed; investment in deposits and in bank
equity is then zero.
Let denote the share of the population of workers in period t who




Having purchased bank equity a banker can accept deposits by offering a return
r'.If he chooses to act fraudulently then he consumes these deposits,
receiving no investment income. His bank the subsequent period is then
worthless. His lifetime utility is v(dt) where dt denotes the value of
deposits. If instead he invests these deposits in firms he earns the marginal
product of capital in the next period, f'(kt+i). He must then compensate
depositors but, having done so, he can sell his bank equity at price
Lifetimeutility is then
v{[f'(kt+i)_r]dt +
Toremove the temptation to perpetrate fraud requires that the bank owner
anticipate an equity price
> [1 +r
—f'(k+i)]dt (20)
If this condition is satisfied with equality then for workers to be15
indifferent between becoming depositors or becoming bankers requires that bank






Investment in deposits and bank equity must exhaust workers' saving so that
dt =(1_Xt)wt (22)
as long as r.0. Competition among firms for labor insures that
w =w(kt) f(kt) -f'(kt)kt (23)
Since bank deposits are the only source of capital
kt+i =dt (24)
If the moral hazard constraint (20) is binding then equations (19)—(24)
constitute a second—order system of difference equations with state variables
and kt and endogenous variables X, r, dt andw. In steady—state the
values of the state variables are self—perpetuating. Denotingas the






Iftechnology is Cobb-Douglas with capital share a then
f(k) =ka (28)




The share of bank equity in wealth is near zero when the capital share in
production is near one. As the capital share falls to zero the proportion of
bank equity in wealth rises toward one—half.
The higher the labor share, the more bankers receive in deposits relative
to the return on investment in firms. The temptation to engage in fraud is
consequently greater. Insuring the honesty of bankers thus requires a higher
value of bank equity relative to deposits.
In contrast, if bank fraud were automatically precluded then all wage




The interest rate is exactly the same as in the equilibrium in which a
positive value of hank equity is required to avoid fraud, even though the wage
and capital stock are higher. The higher capital-labor ratio does not imply a
lower interest rate hecause, in the absence of potential fraud, deposits yield
the marginal product of capital. In the constrained equilibrium the marginal
product of capital is higher, but to provide a positive return on bank equity
requires that deposits yield less than the return on capital.
5. Conclusion
Sustaining an equilibrium with intertemporal trade requires a mechanism
to bind agents to agreements. In a domestic context the police power of the
state serves this purpose for many types of transactions. In international
capital markets this mechanism is less reliable. Nevertheless, institutions
exist that do sustain a considerable amount of intertemporal trade without an
explicit enforcement mechanism.
A borrower's incentive to maintain a reputation for creditworthiness is
one mechanism to enforce repayment that has already received attention.
Penalties other than a loss of reputation for creditworthiness can provide an
incentive to repay, but if implementing the penalty is costly to the lender,
then Pareto—improvinq lending may be dynamically inconsistent. The source of
the inconsistency is not the absence of a penalty for default, hut the18
incredibility of the lender's threat to impose the penalty.
Infinitely-lived institutions can provide agents an incentive to enforce
and honor contracts that finitely—lived individuals lack on their own. Their
owners' desire to maintain the value of their equity in such institutions can
make commitments to undertake actions that would otherwise be dynamically
inconsistent credible. For these institutions to have value requires that
they earn strictly positive profits. The resulting equilibrium is affected
both by the divergence between the interest rates for borrowers and lenders
and by the diversion of savings into bank equity.
In fact, the reputations of institutions do appear to play important
roles in many transactions, in particular those involving agents subject to
different legal authorities. The brand names of the major international banks
and investment houses are well—known. The functioninq of many aspects of
international capital markets seems to require their recognizability where
transactions between anonymous agents could not he sustained.19
Footnotes
1. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981b, 1983), Gersovitz (1983) and Sachs (1984)
discuss the penalties that a sovereign borrower in default may experience.
2. Sargent and Wallace (1982) apply a somewhat similar model to analyze
alternative forms of bank regulation.
3. Jaffee and Russell (1976) show that an inadequate incentive to repay can
lead to credit rationing. Hellwig (1977) shows that the threat to impose
the optimal credit ceiling is not credible in a multi-period context.
4. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a, 1983), Kletzer (1984) and Manuelli (1984)
devise models in which the borrowers desire to maintain a reputation for
creditworthiness in order to borrow again supports an equilibrium with
lending. Klein and Leffler (1981) and, more formally, Dybvig and Spatt
(1980) and Shapiro (1983) explain a firm's incentive to provide quality on
the basis of its incentive to maintain a reputation. Friedman (1971)
formalizes the general notion of how, in an infinitely—repeated game, a
certain degree of cooperation can be sustained by the threat of reverting
to noncooperative behavior indefinitely if one player opportunistically
fails to cooperate in any single period.
5. A justification for this assumption is that if investment takes place then
physical capital provides security for banks and for depositors in turn.
Otherwise the analysis of the previous section would have bearing as well.20
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